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A FLEXIBLE STANDARD FOR STATE
REAPPORTIONIENT CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1971, Connecticut and Virginia reapportioned their state legislatures. Both
plans deviated from precise equality, and in each instance a federal district
court held the resulting dilution of some votes and weighting of others was an
unconstitutional malapportionment in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' In reversing the lower courts' decisions and up-
holding the validity of the proposed plans the Supreme Court announced a new
standard applicable in state legislative reapportionment cases. The contours of
the new standard, charted in Mahan v. Howei, l and Gaffney v. Cummings,3
suggests a shift in the Court's emphasis from mathematical idealism to political
realism, from the personal right of the voter to the institutional integrity of leg-
islative bodies 4 While the Court in Gaffney stated its reluctance to "become
bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment slough," 5 it nevertheless ex-
panded the scope of apportionment issues to include a discussion of the many
competing interests involved in the concept of equal representation in state
legislatures.6
II. STATE INTERESTS: RATIoNA. OR NECESSARY?
A. Mahan v. Howell
In 1971, the Virginia General Assembly passed two statutes reapportioning its
legislature. One statute apportioned 100 delegates in the House among 52 dis-
1. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139 (D. Conn. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138 (EDI. Va. 1971),
modified, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 315 (1973). Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the court; Justice Powell
took no part in the consideration of the case; Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall con-
curred in part and dissented in part.
3. 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (Justices Brennan, Douglas & Marshall dissented).
4. One commentator has argued that the Court's analysis in Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186
(1962), centered on a "specious conception of personal right rather than upon the institutional
aspect of the problem." Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 Mich.
L. Rev. 243, 244 (1964).
S. 412 U.S. at 750.
6. In White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), a congressional election case decided on
the same day as Gaffney, the Court reaffirmed the rule of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969), that in congressional election cases any deviation from mathematical equality
must be shown to have been unavoidable. Congressional cases are distinguished from state
cases: "Keeping in mind that congressional districts are not so intertwined and freighted
with strictly local interests as are state legislative districts and that, as compared with the
latter, they are relatively enormous, with each percentage point of variation representing
almost 5,000 people, we are not inclined to disturb Kirkpatrick and Wells." 412 US. at 793.
It should be noted that the Kirkpatrick rule is not entirely safe since three justices implied
in a separate concurrence that if the same issue were again presented to the Court they
would not apply it. Id. at 798 (Burger, Cj., Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
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tricts throughout the state.7 Since two provisions of the Virginia constitution
gave the General Assembly power to enact special legislation affecting local gov-
ernments, the apportionment plan attempted to respect the physical integrity of
existing political subdivision boundaries. The plan resulted in a maximum devia-
tion from perfect equality of 16.4 percent and an average deviation of plus or
minus 3.89 percent.0 The district court found this deviation to be an unconsti-
tutional dilution of voting strength.10 The second statute, apportioning the state
senate, was not tailored to conform to political boundaries. While nearly perfect
mathematically, it split the city of Norfolk into three districts and arbitrarily
assigned a group of military voters to one district. The district court found this
to be an unconstitutional discrimination and converted the three single member
districts into one three member district."
On appeal, the Supreme Court first discussed the problem presented by the
reapportionment plan of the Virginia house. It framed the issue not positively
in terms of a right to an absolutely equal vote, but negatively in terms of per-
missible deviations from a mathematical ideal: "The principal question thus
presented for review is whether or not the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment ...permits only the 'limited population variances which
are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality' in the
context of state legislative reapportionment.' 2 In resolving that issue the Court
distinguished state legislative from congressional districting cases. In congres-
sional cases the rule applied is that laid down in Wesberry v. Sander§:'8 absolute
mathematical equality among voters.' 4 On the other hand, state cases are con-
trolled by Reynolds v. Sims.'5 While Reynolds required that states strive for
mathematical equality in apportioning their state legislatures, it also suggested
that because of the greater number of seats in state legislatures and the closer
relationship between local and state governments, greater flexibility could be
accorded the state in its implementation of the one man, one vote principle.10
In addition to the considerations suggested in Reynolds, the Mahan Court also
found that if the rigid Wesberry rule were applied to the Virginia reapportion-
7. Va. Code Ann. § 24.1-12.1 (1973).
8. Revised Va. Const., art. VII, §§ 2-3.
9. 410 U.S. at 319.
10. 330 F. Supp. at 1140.
11. Id. at 1147.
12. 410 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)) (foot-
note omitted).
13. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). See Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress:
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 209 (1964); Comment,
Congressional Reapportionment: The Theory of Representation in the House of Representa-
tives, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 286 (1965).
14. The Court based its decision on an analysis of U.S. Cost. art. I, § 2: "The House
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People
of the several States ....
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
16. Id. at 579.
[Vol. 42
REAPPORTIONMENT
ment the practical consequences would be the impairment of the "normal func-
tioning of state and local governments."1 7 While Justice Rehnquist stated that
distinction between the standards of Reynolds and lVesberry had been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in two distinct lines of cases, it appeared that Mahan
was the first state reapportionment case in which the Court had the opportunity
to apply the flexible standard suggested in Reynolds.1 8
While the Reynolds standard is flexible, that flexibility is qualified by Mahan
in two important ways. First, permissible flexibility includes "'such minor de-
viations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that are free from any
taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.' "19 Secondly, the purpose of a flexible
rule is to permit the state to follow a rational policy in reapportionment 2 0 The
Mahan Court underscored this reasonablness factor: "the proper equal protec-
tion test is not framed in terms of 'governmental necessity,' but instead in terms
of a claim that a State may 'rationally consider.' "21 It follows that so long
as its action is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory a state need only strive
for substantial equality in reapportionment and it may be guided by rational
policy considerations when deviating from the mathematical ideal. The Court
found that respect for the integrity of political subdivision boundaries was a
legitimate state interest under the facts in Mahan.a While stating that it was
still possible for mathematical deviations to become so large that no state inter-
est could save the reapportionment plan, the Mahan Court was unwilling to
define the upper limits of its flexible standard.23
17. 410 U.S. at 323.
18. Id. at 322. While the constitutional underpinnings for separate standards appear
sound, the existence of distinct lines of cases is far from clear. It appears that the Court, alter
establishing an absolute rule for congressional cases in Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969), and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 US. 526 (1969), next applied it in a case involving
local government in Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970). Local reapportion-
ment cases decided up to 1970 are analyzed in Martin, The Supreme Court and Local Reap-
portionment: The Third Phase, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 102 (1970). However, in dictum,
Justice White in Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 111 (1971), approved a lower court's application
of the Kirkpatrick standard to a state reapportionment. But see Note, Reapportionment-
Nine Years into the "Revolution" and Still Struggling, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 586 (1972).
19. 410 U.S. at 325, quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). Thus, ap-
portionment statutes which respect traditional subdivisions which subdivisions were them-
selves originally the result of discriminatory action by the state are open to challenge. See
Bussie v. Governor of La., 333 F. Supp. 452, 460-61 (E.D. La.), aff'd with modifications sub
nom. Bussie v. McKeithen, 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded sub noa.
Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
20. 410 U.S. at 324-25, citing both Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 579 (1964), and
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686 (1964).
21. 410 U.S. at 326.
22. Id. at 328.
23. "Neither courts nor legislatures are furnished any specialized calipers that enable
them to extract from the general language of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment the mathematical formula that establishes what range of percentage deviations
is permissible, and what is not." Id. at 329.
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The Court then considered the statute reapportioning the Virginia Senate.2 4
The Senate plan achieved mathematical precision, but by arbitrarily assigning
voters to a district in which they did not reside. 25 In addition to being an im-
permissible use of the flexible apportionment standard because of its arbitrari-
ness, the plan clearly violated a constitutional ban on discrimination against
voters on the basis of their occupation 20
The dissent in Mahan argued that the constitutional standard to be applied
in state reapportionment cases is the same regardless of the level of government
involved: "the paramount goal of reapportionment must be the drawing of dis-
trict lines so as to achieve precise equality in the population of each district." 2 7
Deviations can be justified only by a showing that "some critical governmental
interest" 28 will be jeopardized. In urging a rule of necessity to justify such
deviations the dissent relied on Swann v. Adams2" and Kilgarlin v. Hill." How-
ever, in Swann the reasons required to justify variations from a mathematical
ideal were characterized as "acceptable" 3' 1 and not as "critical." Additionally,
the magnitude alone of the deviations was sufficient to dispose of the plan
despite findings by the district court that the plan did not discriminate against
any section of the state.32 Kilgarlin v. Hill also can be harmonized with the re-
sult in Mahan. The maximum deviation in the plan challenged in Kilgarlin
was 14.84 percent. The district court approved part of the reapportionment plan
because the deviations resulted from an effort to respect existing county boun-
daries and because the plaintiff was unable to sustain the burden of proving the
unconstitutionality of the legislation. 3 The Supreme Court reversed because
the record failed to "demonstrate why or how respect for the integrity of county
lines required the particular deviations. '34 In Mahan, on the other hand, respect
for political subdivisions was shown to be related to a rational state objective--
24. Va. Code Ann. § 24.1-14.1 (1973).
25. 410 U.S. at 330. A group of naval personnel homeported in one district was assigned
for voting purposes to the district where the group was counted in a recent census, although
they actually resided elsewhere.
26. Id. at 332. "Discrimination against a class of individuals, merely because of the nature
of their employment, without more being shown, is constitutionally impermissible." Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964).
27. 410 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 340.
29. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
30. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
31. 385 U.S. at 443. The Court in Swann relied on Reynolds v. Sims for the proposition
that "mathematical exactness is not required in state apportionment plans." Id. at 444.
32. Id. at 444.
33. Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), rev'd sub nom. Kilgarlin
v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) (per curiam). The district court held another aspect of the plan
regarding certain flotorial districts unconstitutional because the resulting dilution of votes
was racially discriminatory. Id. at 410.
34. 386 U.S. at 124 (1967).
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representation in the state legislature geared to a constitutional provision for
local legislation.3s
B. Historical Perspective
Viewed in the perspective of the twenty-seven-year-long debate over reappor-
tionment, the new flexible standard enunciated in Mahan, reflects both a concern
for local interests and a distrust for mathematical decision-making. These two
themes have appeared consistently in opinions in the leading state reapportion-
ment cases. In dicta in Colegrove v. Green,3 6 Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge
rejected the idea of precise mathematical equality in voting. Both viewed the
personal right to an equal vote as one that must be balanced with the state's
interest in the effective representation of the state's numerical minority.3 T In five
separate opinions written in Baker v. Cart,38 each writer agreed that legitimate
state interests may be considered in any reapportionment plan without violating
the fourteenth amendment.3 9 Justices Clark and Stewart advanced the "rational
plan" theory, described as an attempt "to straddle the concededly treacherous
shoals of decision." 40 They first articulated this theory in their separate opinions
35. 410 U.S. at 329.
36. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
37. "If the constitutional provisions on which appellants rely give them the substantive
rights they urge, other provisions qualify those rights in important ways by vesting large
measures of control in the political subdivisions of the Government and the state. There is
not, and could not be except abstractly, a right of absolute equality in voting. At best there
could be only a rough approximation. And there is obviously considerable latitude for the
bodies vested with those powers to exercise their judgment concerning how best to attain
this, in full consistency with the Constitution." Id. at 566 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
38. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
39. Justice Douglas: "Universal equality is not the test; there is room for weighting." Id.
at 244-45. Justice Clark: "No one . . . contends that mathematical equality among voters
is required by the Equal Protection Clause. But certainly there must be some rational design
to a State's districting." Id. at 258. Justice Stewart: "The Equal Protection Clause 'permits
the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others." Id. at 266 (citation omitted). Justice Frankfurter: 'Room con-
tinues to be allowed for weighting. This of course implies that geography, economics, urban-
rural conflict, and all the other non-legal factors which have throughout our history entered
into political districting are to some extent not to be ruled out in the undefined vista now
opened up by review in the federal courts of state reapportionments." Id. at 269 (dissent-
ing opinion). Justice Harlan: "It is surely beyond argument that those who have the respon-
sibility for devising a system of representation may permissibly consider that factors other
than bare numbers should be taken into account." Id. at 333 (dissenting opinion). The
rational plan theory advanced by Justice Clark is a key element in the conceptual back-
ground against which the reapportionment dialogue is conducted. See Neal, Baker v. Carr:
Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 252, 289-90; A. Bickel, Politics and the Warren
Court 181 (1965).
40. E. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Representation 135
(1965). Justice Stewart's views on proportional representation are analyzed in Auerbach, The
Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CL Rev. 1,
31-35.
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in Reynolds v. Sims.41 The test was framed negatively, that is, "'a crazy
quilt,' "42 or a reapportionment plan "completely lacking in rationality '43 would
clearly reveal invidious discrimination. The majority of the Warren Court re-
jected any reapportionment analysis based on rational state objectives and in
later cases applied the test of absolute numerical equality to cases involving
congressional and local elections. 44 Census figures continued to be used as the
basis for reapportionment plans while members of the Court argued that census
figures are notoriously inexact and that mere head-counting was as consistent
with gerrymandering as it was with fair and equal representation.45
In addition to its place in the conceptual framework of the reapportionment
debate, the Makan standard should also be viewed against the broader back-
ground of the protection of personal rights afforded by the fourteenth amend-
ment.46 For example, in statutory discrimination cases the Court has given the
states broad discretion to promote local interests:
[T]he Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.47
41. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
42. Id. at 588 (Clark, J., concurring).
43. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
44. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967). See also McKay, Reappor-
tionment and Local Government, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 713 (1968). In Hadley, the rule of
absolute mathematical equality was pushed to its furthest point for any level of govern-
ment: "[Wlhenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular election
to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate In
that election .... ." 397 U.S. at 56. The dissents in the Hadley case were particularly vigor-
ous in challenging the application of the majority's absolute rule to lower levels of govern-
ment, with no consideration given to legitimate local interests, and seemed to foreshadow the
more flexible rule to be announced in Mahan. Justice Harlan: "The facts of this case afford
a clear indication of the extent to which reasonable state objectives are to be sacrificed on
the altar of numerical equality." Id. at 63. Chief Justice Burger: "Yet the Court has given
almost no indication of which non-population interests may or may not legitimately be
considered by a legislature in devising a constitutional apportionment scheme for a local,
specialized unit of government." Id. at 70-71.
45. "Today's decisions on the one hand require precise adherence to admittedly inexact
census figures, and on the other downgrade a restraint on a far greater potential threat to
equality of representation, the gerrymander." Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969)
(White, J., dissenting). See also Elliot, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora and Procrustes Un-
bound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 474 (1970).
46. See Note, The Apportionment Case: An Expanded Concept of Equal Protection, 1965
Wis. L. Rev. 606, 649; cf. Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What is Fair Representa-
tion? 51 A.BAJ. 319 (1965).
47. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (citations omitted). See gener-
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While this statement of the equal protection test demands minimum content in
the rational basis of a valid apportionment statute, the Court did not apply it
in any of the apportionment cases decided during the 1972 Term= 8 Although
this may be the direction in which the Court is heading, the decisions in Mahan
and Gaffney seem to require something more than a merely conceivable rational
basis. The choice, made in Baker v. Carr, of apportionment analysis under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment"0 rather than under the
guaranty clause o gave the Court the option of balancing the burden on the per-
sonal right to vote with the benefit to public interest, and the additional option
of determining whether the scales would be pre-weighted in favor of one side.
In Mahan the Court considered both sides of the balancing equation and the
result was a shift from analysis centered upon personal rights to one viewing
both the personal right and the integrity of the political body: 5 1 "[T]he right
to vote is not simply the right to an equal vote or to equal participation in elec-
tions, but more significantly is the right to cast a vote appropriately restricted
on the basis of the nature and functions of the governmental body in question,
the nature of the burdens imposed on voters, and the government's justifications
for the restrictions.152
The reapportionment standard in state legislative cases outlined in Mahan
can be stated as follows: the state may reapportion legislative districts so as to
achieve equality in population and also to further legitimate state interests,
provided that its actions are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,' and provided
ally Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham
L. Rev. 605 (1973).
48. State courts appear to have anticipated the reapportionment rule developed by the
Supreme Court last term: "The standards used by the state courts in apportionment cases
are remarkably simlar to the flexible test developed by the Supreme Court to measure state
action against the equal-protection clause, the test of rational basis.... The view that the
equal-protection clause is in essence 'a demand for purity of motive' has been persuasively
argued." Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057,
1085-86 (1958) (footnote omitted).
49. That choice is analyzed in Dixon, Apportionment Standards and Judicial Power, 38
Notre Dame Law. 367 (1963); Note, Reapportionment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1228, 124143
(1966).
50. The Court historically has disposed of cases under the guaranty clause (U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 4) on political question grounds; see, e.g., Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S.
118 (1912); Luther v. Bordon, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 139 (1849). These cases are distinguished
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-29 (1962).
51. See generally Kauper, supra note 4.
52. Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40
U. Chi. L. Rev. 807, 827 (1973).
53. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Where a state's requirements for entering
the political process are deemed to discriminate against minority groups the Court gives
little weight to the state interest advanced in justification. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 US.
134 (1972) (candidate filing fees unconstitutional). But see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752 (1973) (registration requirements upheld). The actions which will be held discriminatory
include: denying minority groups access to the political process (White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973)) ; minimizing or canceling out the voting strength of racial or polit-
1974]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
further, that deviations from numerical equality are not so large as to outweigh
state policy objectives. Within six months, the Supreme Court in Gajney had
the opportunity to define the limits of the flexible Mahan standard.
III. PimAr FAcIE CASE AND POSSIBiE DEFENSES
A. Gaffney v. Cummings
The Connecticut General Assembly appointed a three-man bipartisan board to
formulate a new reapportionment plan for the state. The Board followed a prin-
ciple of "political fairness" in outlining a reappointment plan for the state. The
"political fairness" principle meant that "the Board took into account the party
voting results in the preceding three statewide elections, and, on that basis,
created what was thought to be a proportionate number of Republican and
Democratic legislative seats."154 The plan resulted in an average deviation of 1.9
percent and a maximum deviation of 7.83 percent. 5 The plan was challenged on
grounds that in achieving such a low numerical deviation an excessive number
of town boundaries were cut and that the "political fairness" principle resulted
in a Republican gerrymander. The district court held the plan unconstitutional
because of the dilution of votes in the more populous towns and the policy of
partisan political structuring.56
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that three of the four alternative plans
suggested by the plaintiff involved deviations greater than those in the Board's
plan.5 7 On the other hand, the Court noted that, in any case, a resourceful mind
might hit upon a plan more mathematically precise by a percentage point and
thus make a case for invalidating an existing plan. The Court found a need to
cut off judicial involvement in such litigation.58 Reversing the district court, the
Court established the lower limit of the flexible Mahan standard:
It is now time to recognize, in the context of the eminently reasonable approach of Rey-
nolds v. Sims, that minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative
ical elements of the population (Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143-50 (1971); Burns
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)); and
depriving a racial group of their pre-existing municipal vote (Gomllion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) (based on the fifteenth amendment)).
54. 412 U.S. at 738.
55. Id. at 750.
56. Cummings v. Meskill, 341 F. Supp. 139, 150 (D. Conn. 1972), rev'd sub nona. Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
57. 412 U.S. at 739.
58. "And what is to happen to the Master's plan if a resourceful mind hits upon a
plan better than the Master's by a fraction of a percentage point? Involvements like this
must end at some point, but that point constantly recedes if those who litigate need only
produce a plan that is marginally 'better' when measured against a rigid and unyielding
population-equality standard." Id. at 750-51.
It has been argued that the mathematical equality rule reduces judicial involvement. Irwin,
Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 Mich. L. Rev
729 (1969).
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districts are insufficient to make out a prima fade case of invidious discrimation under
the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.9
Minor deviations are those no greater than the maximum 7.8 percent involved in
this case or the 9.9 percent involved in the companion case, White v. Regester.co
The absence of a prima fade case based on minor deviations is justified by the
inherent inexactness of the census figures used, 1 by the rapid shifts in district
populations,62 and by the failure of census figures to reflect various classes of
non-voting residents. 63 Failure to establish a minimum numerical threshold
means that any mathematical deviation may be sufficient to render a reapportion-
ment plan unconstitutional and in effect equates fair representation with numeri-
cal equality."
The effect of the Gaffney holding is to reallocate the burden of proof in
reapportionment cases. Under the former rule of Kilgarlin v. Hill,0 the plaintiff
had to prove only that deviations existed and that another plan could be formu-
lated which would reduce those deviations. Presumably, deviations as low as
5 percent rendered apportionment plans subject to constitutional attack."" The
Mahan standard, qualified by Gaffney and White, requires that a plaintiff show
either a deviation at least exceeding 9.9 percent or an arbitrary discrimination
before the burden shifts to the state. Once the burden has shifted, the state must
justify the deviation by showing a competing rational state interest. In Gaffney
the state interest sustained by the Court was "political fairness."0 7 In effect,
the Court recognized that the right to vote is essentially political rather than
personal: it is only one element in fair and effective representation in govern-
ment. Another element is the proportional representation of all interest groups
in the state. Combination of the mathematical approach to reapportionment
problems together with a winner-take-all electoral system could effectively
nullify the representation of a state's minorities and their interests:08
Fair and effective representation may be destroyed by gross population variations
among districts, but it is apparent that such representation does not depend solely
59. 412 U.S. at 745.
60. 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973). "Very likely, larger differences between districts would not
be tolerable without justification 'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectu-
ation of a rational state policy2" Id. (citations omitted).
61. 412 U.S. at 745-46.
62. Id. at 746-47.
63. E.g., non-resident military personnel, non-resident students, nonvoters otherwise
eligible. Id. at 747.
64. Insistence on mathematical equality has led to the development of the much criti-
cized multi-member districts. See, Washington, Does the Constitution Guarantee Fair and
Effective Representation to all Interest Groups Making up the Electorate, 17 How. L.J. 91
(1971).
65. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
66. T. O'Rourke, Reapportionment Law, Politics, Computers 28 (1972).
67. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
68. T. O'Rourke, supra note 66, at 31.
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on mathematical equality among district populations.... An unrealistic over emphasis
on raw population figures, a mere nose count in the districts, may submerge these other
considerations and itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day
operation are important to an acceptable representation and apportionment arrange-
ment.6 9
In dictum, the Court in Gaffney pointed to a number of factors other than
proportional representation which legitimately may be taken into account in a
reapportionment plan.70 For example, a state may seek to preserve the integrity
of its political subdivision boundaries where there is an important relationship
between the subdivisions as separate political entities and their representation in
the legislature.71 A state may consider whether there is a compelling need for
coordination between varying levels of government within the state.72 Similarly,
where a local government requires specialized knowledge of the problems of a
rural area contained within the boundaries of a city, mathematical deviations
will be justified in order to provide for such knowledge. 78 Deviations are justi-
fied where the governmental body performs essentially administrative functions.74
The desire of a group of citizens who are willing to forego equal representation
in order to be joined with another district sharing their peculiar problems and
interests will also be given effect. 75
B. Historical Analysis
The dangerous possibility that minorities could be excluded from the political
process by an artificial and unrealistic apportionment standard had been dis-
cussed in previous state reapportionment cases. In Colegrove v. Green, Justice
Frankfurter related the congressional requirement of districting to minority
representation:
The upshot of judicial action may defeat the vital political principle which led Con-
gress, more than a hundred years ago, to require districting. This requirement, in the
language of Chancellor Kent, "was recommended by the wisdom and justice of giving,
as far as possible, to the local subdivisions of the people of each state, a due influence
in the choice of representatives, so as not to leave the aggregate minority of the people
in a state, though approaching perhaps to a majority, to be wholly overpowered by the
combined action of the numerical majority, without any voice whatever in the national
councils." 76
69. 412 U.S. at 748-49 (footnote omitted). But see Edwards, The Gerrymander and
"One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.UL. Rev. 879, 896-97 (1971). See also Dixon, Reapportion-
ment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation,
63 Mich. L. Rev. 209 (1964).
70. 412 U.S. at 749. The Court did not explain in detail the nature of these legitimate
state interests, but only referred to previous cases where various state interests had been
upheld. See notes 71-74 infra.
71. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
72. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 186 (1971).
73. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 116 (1967).
74. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110 (1967).
75. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
76. 328 U.S. at 553 (citation omitted).
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In Baker v. Carr, Justice Harlan argued that representation of an agricultural
minority in a state might justify electoral imbalance.71 In Reynolds v. Sims he
argued that "people are not ciphers" and that legislators must speak "for their
interests-economic, social, political."78 Justice Stewart argued in Lucas v.
Colorado Gen. Assembly79 that the majority view expressed in the Court's in-
sistence on numerical equality was simply one political theory among many and
that a state should be able to innovate "the design of its democratic institutions,
so as to accommodate within a system of representative government the inter-
ests and aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any group
or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or highly orga-
nized majority."80
In Gaffney, the Court seems to have expressed a lack of confidence in the
logic of pre-Mahan reapportionment decisions to assure proportional representa-
tion of interests in state legislatures.81 The new rationale is based on a func-
tional conception of the state legislature and therefore tolerates insubstantial
infringements on personal rights. The Court in Gaffney and White indicated
the numerical threshold which must be crossed before the flexible Mahan stan-
dard becomes applicable and suggested some of the rational objectives which
may be pursued by states to justify deviations above the threshold level, in-
cluding the proportional representation of significant minority interest groups.
In addition, judicial scrutiny should continue to be exercised on all plans chal-
lenged on the other pole of the Mahan rule: arbitrariness or discrimination, re-
gardless of the plan's numerical perfection.8 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The state reapportionment cases decided during the 1972 Term, Mahan and
Gaffney, represent not so much a retreat from the rule of "one person, one vote"
as a shift in emphasis from the concept of the vote as a personal right, to a view
of the vote as a part of the total institutional political process. By viewing the
apportionment problem as one involving a cluster of rights and interests the
Court has fashioned a standard for judicial decision-making which, in a proper
case, requires the district court to examine the factual political situation in its
state in its entirety.
The flexibility of the new rule appears to be its chief advantage over the
former, purely mathematical standard. In the first instance, it aids judicial
administration by disregarding de minimis variations from mathematical equality.
At the same time, it allows purely arbitrary apportionments, possibly including
77. "Indeed, I would hardly think it unconstitutional if a state legislature's expressed
reason for establishing or maintaining an electoral imbalance between its rural and urban
population were to protect the State's agricultural interests from the sheer weight of num-
bers of those residing in its dties." 369 U.S. 186, 336 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
78. 377 U.S. 533, 623-24 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
79. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
80. Id. at 748-49 (dissenting opinion).
81. But see Irwin, supra note 58.
82. 412 U.S. at 751-52.
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gerrymanders, to be challenged notwithstanding their mathematical symmetry.
While it might be argued that federal judges are ill-equipped to make the prag-
matic political decisions which the Supreme Court seems to require, or that ap-
portionment litigation will become hopelessly bogged down in the testimony of
political scientists, sociologists and others, 3 the answer must be that an appor-
tionment decision will always be fundamentally political in nature and impact,
regardless of the standard used, and that the most effective political decision
made by a court will be one on which it is most fully informed.8 4
Of necessity, critical evaluation of Mahan and Gaffney is incomplete until
the flexible standard they announce is applied in specific cases and given more
content.8" The Court appears to have laid the conceptual foundation for a judi-
cial definition of republican government; it must still define the state interests
which will be allowed to become part of the superstructure.
Edward D. McKeever
83. See Irwin, supra note 58, at 748-49.
84. See R. Dixon, Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics
19-20 (1968).
85. See Israel, Non-population Factors Relevant to an Acceptable Standard of Appor-
tionment, 38 Notre Dame Law. 499 (1963).
